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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
— *• r- -. ^onlerr^d un-ier T..]c 12 ~r -ue T .* ^les 
~
r
 Appelant . • - iJ>. * *' »-*M-» r f'-on * istri:^ 
Cour*: * : this "G-J-- :~ ' , :,n . c. -
" ~L - .. e JH v^y, * - ^ 1 - • - '•" 2 i vi I Procedur- " • e ;:>. i ° 
5 /*•'• ;u>.-' wi^ entered
 JJL the iNcciCi of 
Appeal. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
I . ' '- *nn :\-ite : . 953 as 
amended, had wc* > juimep e^ : •;* _ . * ovements 
»"i 1 In (in'ipertv in question prior to June / » 1484, when Home 
Savings recorded its Deed ul lYi^r? 
IT, Are attorney's fees contemplated by )n \ 1 <, hi ih 
Lode MiiiiutJLod M'Vil as amended) where the Court determines 
only the issue of priority and nui 1 in is^m* nf enforcement? 
STATUTES 
This Court is asked ro interpret the provisions of (H-J-J 
38-1-5, and 38-i-lb, Ut.-ih Coee Annotated (1951 as amended), All 
three statutes have been quoted verbatim M, 'fiefs' 11I.M pp'iier. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The nature, of this case has been accurately stated as have 
the facts in appelant 3i'"i respondent briefs filed previously. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
I 
Site preparation and excavation of property done in connection 
with the planned and anticipated construction of buildings consti-
tutes the Mcommencement to do work" for purposes of 38-1-5, 
Utah Code Annotated so that the lien of the general contractor 
Western General Construction Company has priority over the Deed 
of Trust recorded by Home Savings and Loan Association subsequent 
to the date that such work began. 
II 
The distinction between the issue of lien enforcement and 
the issue of priority precludes Home Savings from recovering 
attorney's fees incurred in determining the latter, 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The brief filed in support of Home Savings1 position doesn't 
take into consideration the fact that the language of 38-1-5 of the 
Utah Code is much broader than the language of the statutes that 
are interpreted by the cases cited by it in support of its 
position that its Deed of Trust has priority over Western General's 
lien and is in fact broader than it used to be when originally 
adopted. 
The predecessor of the present 38-1-5 UCA was Section 1385 
of the Revised Statutes of L898 which read as follows: 
"The liens herein provided shall relate back 
to and take effect as of the time of the commencement 
to do work upon AND (emphasis added) furnish materials 
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on the ground for the structure or improvement, and 
shall have priority over any lien or encumbrance subse-
quently intervening, except a lien herein provided for 
of the same class, or which may have been created prior 
thereto which was not then unrecorded and of which the 
lienor under this chapter did have actual notice." 
The word "AND" is emphasized because of the fact that it 
has been changed under our present statute to read "OR" so that 
the statute now reads that "the liens herein provided for shall 
relate back to and take effect as of the time of the commencement 
to do work upon OR furnish materials on the ground ..." so that 
the statute now does not require the furnishing of materials 
but only that Western General commenced to do work on the 
ground itself. 
At page 10 of its brief, Home Savings cites the Court to 
the case of Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 294 P.2d 703 
(1956), where the Court in interpreting similar language in 
the bond claim statute concluded that the plowing, seeding or 
manuring of land or its leveling for that purpose was insufficient 
to constitute the commencement of an improvement upon land. 
However, in Frehner v. Morton, 424 P.2d 446, 18 Utah 2d 422, 
the Utah Supreme Court distinguished the Backus case in an 
opinion written by Justice Ellet and concurred in by Justices 
Callister and Tuckett with the following language: 
"The reasonable interpretation of the legislative 
intent gathered from the statute would seem to make it 
applicable only to contracts involving buildings or 
structures of some sort." 
In the case before this court, the excavation work was clearly 
done in connection with a building that was not only contemplate 
at the time, but is now completed. It just wasn't fully paid fo 
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A prudent contractor relying on his lien rights to ensure 
payment to him for his work first checks the title to the 
land upon which the improvements are to be installed and 
determines that there are no mortgages ahead of him. This is 
done before he incurs expenses. Then he moves on the site with 
his equipment and starts to clear and build. If his excavation 
work is visible to anyone inspecting the premises, he should be abl< 
to rely on the fact that he need not go back and check the title 
to the property again. According to Western's President, the 
fact that work had begun on the project would have been apparent 
prior to June 7, 1984 (R-258) and Home Savings already knew the 
nature of the project. 
The response brief at page 13 cites the Calder Brothers 
case previously decided by the Supreme Court of Utah in 1982 
(Calder Brothers Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
In that case two trees were cut down, weeds were cleared, and 
a building was painted and grouted before the mortgage was 
recorded. The Court determined that work to be merely 
maintenance work that was not connected with a contract to 
improve the interior of the building and is, therefore, not 
in point. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons and the reasons sub-
mitted in Western General's original brief, this Court should 
determine that its mechanics lien has priority over the trust 
deed of Home Savings and Loan. A failure to do so would be 
to ignore the purpose of the broad language of 38-1-5 U.C.A., 
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and that is to do justice, 
ffThe aim. and purpose of our mechanics lien law 
manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those 
who perform the labor and furnish the materials which 
enter into the construction * \l;.j "ne --*- vt-. r 
improvement " 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah I"*'. 1 "^7 ™ ' 
at 2'-*A , «' 191 "M 
"The most important thing to remember is that 
mechanics liens are favored under Utah law. They 
are intended to protect those who provide materials \ 
or services for the improvement of real property, 
and the Court will try to find any way possible to 
see iustice done." 
BYU J. I.egal Studies, 
l~*;-f: ' ''un1 I It- iofpd "hat the case at bar 
involves nothing more i ban -i determination oi i <
 ti u> • 
r • ' r :**->; -r- interpreted and applied M s 
regard ther- ..;. • u o u n 
— ^ v ^:rr;it- u:tr^ri"- • •• ruse issues, and they have re..- ; 
* - - c i , ; precedents ^ :..._:= state ,n gi'. :ng 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE NOT CONTEMPLATED BY 38-1-IP. UTAH 
CODE ANNO'IAIMJ I'1''1 '\ AMENDED WHERE THE COURT DETERMINES ONLY 
THE ISSUE PRIORITY AND NOT TH1 * . 
Hnde . . • ,
 z^:j 18 
of responden 
contemplated tr.at -~ _' action hrr .g*~ - ^ ; o r c e 5. i-r ^ 
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successful party recovers attorney's fees. There is a distinction 
that has to be made between the issue of lien enforcement and 
the issue of priority. Western GeneralTs lien is perfectly 
enforceable, it is just worthless if it is determined to be 
second in priority. Awarding attorney's fees in an action to 
determine the priorities of the liens is not contemplated by 
that statute. The issue as Home Savings points out is whether 
or not the mortgage lender can be included within the meaning of 
the term "successful party." 
38-1-17 U.C.A. provides as follows: 
"Costs-Apportionment-Costs and attorneys1 fee 
to subcontractor.--As between the owner and the 
contractor the court shall apportion the costs 
according to the right of the case, but in all 
cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall 
have his costs awarded to him, including the costs 
of preparing and recording the notice of claim of 
lien and such reasonable attorney's fee as may be 
incurred in preparing and recording said notice of 
claim of lien." 
Note that the language makes reference to apportioning 
costs as between the owner and the contractor. That provision 
read in connection with 38-1-5 indicates that those statutes 
deal with owners and contractors and not with trust deed 
holders. 
"It is plain that these two sections relating 
to this subject should be construed together and 
that when attorney's fees are awardable thereunder 
they are to be treated as costs which, as expressed 
in 38-1-17 the court shall apportion the costs accord-
ing to the right of the case." 
Shupe v. Menlove, 18 Utah 2d 130, 417 P.2d 246. 
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At page 23 of its brief, Home Savings cites the court to 
Brubaker v. Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57 P. 170 (1899), as supporting 
its position that a failure to award attorney's fees in this 
action would constitute an unconstitutional interpretation of 
the applicable statute. The Brubaker case, however, was a 
dispute between an owner and a contractor, and the court simply 
said at page 402: 
"If the section of our statute which allows 
attorney's fees had given a fee to the winning 
party, plaintiff or defendant, then the law would 
not be subject to the objections raised, because 
equal protection would be granted to both plaintiff 
and defendant, but when the statute says that the 
plaintiff shall have an attorney's fee if he wins 
but does not give the same to the defendant if he 
wins, there is no equality in the law." 
There is no doubt that under our constitution, that 
is sound logic. It is respectfully submitted, however, that 
it does not apply in the case at bar because of the fact that 
the court is not asked to resolve an issue between an owner 
and a contractor, it was simply asked to resolve the priority 
between two lien holders. CONCLUSION 
The attorney's fee statute cited above does not contemplate 
that anyone other than the owner or the contractor be awarded 
their attorney's fees. Norreferetice" is^ inade -to ^atiy "other 
parties who might be involved in the litigation as well. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's 
determination that Home Savings and Loan Association should not 
have their attorney's fees paid in a proceeding to determine 
the priorities between two lien holders should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted this 14th day of July, 1987. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Attorney for Appellant and 
Cross-Respondent Western 
General Construction Co., Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Memorandum were mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Keith W. Meade 
Attorney for Home Savings and Loan Association 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, 
this 14th day of July, 1987. 
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Telephone: 756-3576 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN-AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE.OF UTAH 
VINCENT ROTTA, Jr., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HAL HAWK, et.al., 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
AFFIDAVIT" OF- J. STERLING WOOTTON 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Judge Hanson 
Civil No. C84-6174 
No. C85-5268 
No. C85-5384 
No. C86-1310 
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) 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Utah 
J. Sterling Wootton, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. At all times relavent to theae proceedings I was and 
am now, President of the plaintiff Western General Construction 
Company. 
2. During the months of April and May of 1984, our Company 
was engaged in the construction of a large self-storage unit locat 
at 9100 South State Street in Salt Lake County for Pihl and Clark 
Enterprises Inc. In that capacity I have examined the Affidavit 
of Don Pihl dated April 8,1986, that was filed in support of the 
Motion of Home Savings and Loan Association for Summary Judgment 
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on the issue of priority of Mechanic's Liens- over a. Trust 
Deed of Home Savings and Loan that was recorded June 7,1984. 
3. In Paragraph 5 Mr. Pihl acknowledges that there was a 
general clearing of plant material and the moving of top soil on 
Parcels A and B of the property prior to June 7,1984. I was presen 
on that project during April and May,1984, in my official capacity 
and observed that the general clearing of plant material consisted 
of the removal of a number of trees that were over 3* feet high 
and the removal of brush and other ground cover that exceed heighth 
of » feet. The work was done by Large Tree Removal Equipment, 
back hoes and traxcavators, all of which were working on parcels 
A and B prior to June 7,1984. A large portion of the earth that 
was used to prepare the property described as Parcels 1,2 and 3 
came from A and B, during those two months. 
4. To any one observing the job site during April and May 
of 1984, the fact that work had begun on the project would have bee 
apparent. 
5. I have been informed by those working on the job everyda 
and therefore represent to the Court, that to our knowledge no one 
from Home Savings and Loan Association ever came out to the job sit 
prior to June 7,1984, nor did anyone from that Company ever call 
our office prior to that date to determine whether or not we had 
commenced work on those parcels of property. 
s/zd&Z+r &k 
J. Sterling Wootton 
President, Western General 
Construction Company 

MECHANICS1 LIENS 38-1-3 
applicable. Boberts v. Hansen, 25 U. (2d) 
190, 479 P. 2d 345. 
Time for filing lien. 
Materialman who supplies homeowner 
is original contractor within meaning of 
statute and has eighty rather than sixty-
days within which to file mechanic's lien 
against homeowner's transferee. Smith 
Brothers Lbr. Co. v. Johnson, 19 U. (2d) 
107, 426 P. 2d 811. 
Collateral References. 
Mechanics' Liens<@=>86. 
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens §§ 90, 97. 
53 Am. Jar. 2d 512, Mechanics' Liens 
§i-
Who is a "contractor" within provisions 
of lien law which limit liens for material 
or labor furnished to contractor to amount 
earned but unpaid on contract, or give 
such liens by subrogation, S3 A L. B. 1152. 
38-1-3. Those entitled to Ken—What may be attached—Lien on ores 
mined.—Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any serv-
ices or furnishing any materials used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any prem-
ises in any manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish materials 
for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any minin* 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed architects 
and engineers and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or 
who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, 
shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value of 
the service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by each re-
spectively, whether at the instance of the owner or of any other person 
acting by his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner may have in the property, but the 
interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, whether working 
under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of this chapter include 
products mined and excavated while the same remain upon the premises 
included within the lease. 
History: E. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, 
§§ 1372, 1381, 1382, 1397; L. 1911, ch. 27, 
§12; O. L. 1917, §§286, 3722, 3731, 3732, 
3747; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-3; L. 1973, 
ch. 73, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1973 amendment substituted "any 
services or * * * in any manner" near the 
beginning of the first sentence for "labor 
upon, or furnishing materiaJs to be used 
in, the construction or alteration of, or 
addition to, or repair of, any building, 
structure or improvement upon land; all 
foundry men and boilermakers; all persons 
performing labor or furnishing materials 
for the construction, repairing or carrying 
on of any mill, manufactory or hoisting 
works." 
Cross-Reference. 
Bond to protect mechanics and material-
men under private contracts, 14-2-1. 
Construction and application. 
The purpose of the lien statutes is to 
protect those who have added directly to 
the value of property by performing labor 
or furnishing materials upon it. Stanton 
Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 U. (2d) 184, 
341 P. 2d .207, explained in 23 U. (2d) 
395, 464 P. 2d 387. 
This statute contemplates that the mate-
rial to be lienable must be consumed in its 
use on the property. Stanton Transporta-
tion Co. v. Davis, 9 U. (2d) 184, 341 P. 
2d 207, explained in 23 U. (2d) 395, 464 
P. 2d 387. 
Where several lien claimants are unable 
to segregate and fix the value of materials 
which went into various properties, it is 
proper to apply an equitable apportion-
ment rule which would charge each lot 
with an equal share of the totals claimed 
by the several materialmen; and in apply-
ing this rule it should be made to appear 
that there is no available means of definite 
proof as to just what material went into 
which unit of property, that there is suf-
ficient proof that some material actually 
went into structures, and that the land is 
sufficiently identified and described in the 
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38-1-4 LIENS 
38-1-4. Amount of land affected—Lots and subdivisions—Mines—Fitan. 
chises, fixtures and appurtenances.—The liens granted by this chapter shall 
extend to and cover so much of the land whereon such building, structure 
or improvement shall be made as may be necessary for the convenient 
use and occupation thereof, and in case any such building shall occupy 
two or more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots or subdivisions 
shall be deemed one for the purposes of this chapter; and when twd or 
more mining claims, mines or valuable deposits, whether owned by the 
same person or not, shall, with the consent of all, be worked through a 
common shaft, tunnel, incline, drift or other excavation, then all the mining 
claims, mines or valuable deposits so worked shall for the purposes of 'this 
chapter be deemed one; and the liens in this chapter provided for sjhall 
attach to all franchises, privileges, appurtenances, and to all machinery jand 
fixtures, pertaining to or used in connection with any such lands, buildings, 
structures or improvements, mining claims, mines or valuable deposits. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, 
§§1377, 1379, 1381; C. L. 1917, §§3727, 
3729, 3731; B. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-4. 
Lumber. 
Although lumber delivered went into 
different structures, it was delivered under 
single contract and each of structures con-
stituted part of single plant; therefore, 
lien exists on entire premises for lumber 
used in each structure. Salt Lake Litho-
graphing Co. v. Ibex Mine & Smelting Co., 
15 U. 440, 49 P. 768, 62 Am. St. Eep. 944. 
Questions of law and fact. 
The question of how much land is nec-
essary is question of fact. Park City Meat 
Co. v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 U. 
145, 103 P. 254. 
Eemoved building. 
Removal of building by third persons 
to land other than that on which it was 
originally erected without knowledge and 
consent of owner thereof, or- mechanic's 
lien holders, does not relieve building in 
its new location from liability of a defi-
ciency existing on the sale of the land on 
which the building was erected to satisfy 
such liens. Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 U. 379, 
85 P. 363, 85 P. 1012. 
Scope and extent of lien generally. 
Necessary appurtenances, including ease-
ments which extend outside of boundaries 
of land upon which building is erected, 
is covered by provisions of this section. 
Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock gfilver 
Mining Co., 36 U. 145, 103 P. 254. 
Waiver, loss or forfeiture of lien, 
Where there is substantial compliance 
with statute creating lien, and Hen has in 
fact been established, lien so established 
cannot be defeated by technicalities nor 
by nice distinctions. Park City Meajt Co. 
v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 UL 145, 
103 P. 254. 
Collateral Eeferences. 
Mechanics' LiensC=>22. 
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 20. 
53 Am. Jur. 2d 553, Mechanics' Liens 
§39. 
Construction, application, and effect of 
provision of lien statute as to quantity or 
area of land around improvement which 
may be subjected to the lien, 84 A.|L. E. 
123. 
Mechanic's lien for work on or material 
for separate buildings of one ownjer, 15 
A. L. R. 3d 73. 
Single mechanic's lien upon several par-
cels, as enforceable against less than all 
of the parcels (including effect of release 
of some of them from the lien), 130 A. 
L. B. 423. 
38-1-5. Priority—Over other encumbrances.—The liens herein provided 
for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the comipence-
ment to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure pr im-
provement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or othpr en-
cumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time wh^n the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first 
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MECHANICS' LIENS 38-1-5 
material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was un-
recorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was com-
menced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground. 
History: E. S. 1898 & C. I*. 1907, 
$$1084, 1385; C. L. 1917, §§3734, 3735; 
R. S. 1933 & G. 1943, 52-1-5. 
Commencement and duration of lien. 
Tins section expressly provides that liens 
ahall attach at the time the performance 
of the contract commences; accordingly, 
claimant's lien attaches on the date he 
commences the work or furnishes the ma-
terial, and is not postponed to the date of 
filing the notice for record. Morrison v. 
Carey-Lombard Co., 9 U. 70, 33 P. 238, ex-
plained in 10 U. 274, 37 P. 495. 
Mechanic's lien takes effect as of date 
of commencement of work and furnishing 
of materials, and is prior to intervening 
equities. Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 U. 379, 85 
P. 363, 85 P. 1012. 
When labor and materials are furnished 
to one not an owner, lien attaches to 
title instant title vests in owner so con-
tracting for labor and materials furnished 
before he became the owner. United States 
Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Midvale Home Fi-
nance Corp., 86 XJ. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, reh. 
den. S6 U. 522, 46 P. 2d 672. 
Estoppel. 
A person furnishing materials may be 
estopped by his or its acts and conduct 
from enjoying the priority accorded by 
this section. Spargo v. Nelson, 10 TJ. 274, 
37 P. 495. 
Extent of Uen, 
While mortgagee who advances money 
to mortgagor to construct a building has 
lien prior to that of a subcontractor per-
forming labor and furnishing materials 
for such building, such Uen extends only 
to amount actually advanced on mortgage. 
Culmer Paint & Glass Co. v. Gleason, 42 
U. 344, 130 P. 66. 
Notice to lien holders. 
This section requires other lien holders, 
by mortgage or otherwise, to take notice 
of the commencement of work on the 
building. Teahen v. Nelson, 6 U. 363, 23 P. 
764. 
Priority over other Hens and claims. 
A deed of trust upon a canal to be con-
structed cannot take precedence over a 
mechanic's lien for work done and mate-
rials furnished in building the canal, al-
though trust deed antedates the doing 
of the work or furnishing the materials. 
Canal is not in existence until constructed. 
Garland v. Bear Lake & River Waterworks 
& Irr. Co., 9 U. 350, 34 P. 368, affd. 164 
U. S. 1, 41 L. Ed. 327, 17 S. Ct. 7. 
Lien for all of materials furnished by 
single lien claimant on continuous, open, 
running account, for purpose of develop-
ing and operating mine, held prior to 
trust deed executed by mining company 
and recorded between times when mate-
rials are first and last furnished. Fields 
v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 25 U. 76, 69 
P. 528; Salt Lake-Hardware Co. v. Fields, 
69 P. 1134, not officially reported. 
Where vendees of land contracts on 
property involved jointly assigned errors 
in mortgage foreclosure action on cross-
appeal, their liens are postponed to date 
of last vendee's contract, and claims of 
lien claimants attach as of date when first 
materials are furnished and first labor per-
formed; and claim of lien claimants is 
held superior to claim of such vendees in 
foreclosure action. United States Bldg. & 
Loan Assn. v. Midvale Home Finance 
Corp., 86 U. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, reh. den. 
86 U. 522, 46 P. 2d 672. 
Lien for labor and materials supplied 
purchaser of lot for building constructed 
thereon is inferior to interest of vendor 
of the lot and his successor, where it is 
not shown that vendor or his successor 
consent to, ratify, or authorize the fur-
nishing of the materials and labor. Burton 
Walker Lbr. Co. v. Howard, 92 U. 02, 66 
P. 2d 134. 
In determining priorities between con-
struction mortgagee and mechanic's lien-
ors, mortgage for definite amount recorded 
prior to attachment of any Uen takes 
priority up to the amount actually paid 
over any mechanic's Hens attaching sub-
sequent to recording of mortgage, although 
loan which mortgage is intended to secure 
is paid over to borrower as needed and 
never advanced in full. Western Mtg. Loan 
Corp. v. Cottonwood Coustr. Co., 18 U. 
(2d) 409, 424 P. 2d 437. 
Purchase money mortgage. 
A mechanic's lien is superior even to a 
purchase money mortgage given at time of 
purchase of property in question where 
mortgagee, after materials are furnished, 
releases original mortgage and takes new 
mortgage, which transaction, however, is 
not in renewal of old mortgage, but is 
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38-1-17. Costs—Apportionment—Costs and attorneys* * fee to subcon-
tractor.—As between the owner and the contractor the court shall appor-
tion the costs according to the right of the case, but in all cases each sub-
contractor exhibiting a lien shall have his costs awarded to him, including 
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of claim of lien and ^ueh 
reasonable attorney's fee as may be incurred in preparing and recording 
said notice of claim of lien. 
History: E. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, §1394; 
C. L. 1917, § 3744; E. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
52-1-17; L. 1961, ch. 76, §1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment added provision for 
reasonable attorney's fees for preparation 
and recording of notice of claim of lien. 
Interest on judgment. 
In action to foreclose mechanic's lien 
History: E. S. 1898, § 1400; L. 1899, ch. 
58, §1 ; C. L. 1907, §1400; C. L. 1917, 
§ 3750; E. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 52-1-18; L. 
1961, en. 76, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment deleted a provision 
fixing the minimum amount of attorneys' 
fees of not to exceed $25. 
Cross-Eeference. 
Attorneys' fee in suit for wages, 34-
27-1. 
Denial on excessive claim. 
THiere it appears on trial that contrac-
tor has substantially performed his con-
tract but that he attempts to overcharge 
the owner in setting the total amount due 
on a cost-plus-ten-per-cent contract, the 
court does not abuse its discretion in re-
fusing to award the contractor attorney 
fees in suit to collect upon such contract. 
Shupe v. Menlove, 18 V. (2d) 130, 417 P. 2d 
246. 
Eeduction by trial court. 
Lower court can properly reduce award 
of attorney's fees to party successful in 
foreclosing mechanic's lien by one-half of 
jury's award since under statute award of 
jury is advisorv onlv. Frehner v. Morton, 
18 TJ. (2d) 422,* 424 P. 2d 446. 
Successful party. 
Award of attorney's fees is available to 
and to recover for services rendered un-
der contract of employment, it is not Terror 
to allow interest on sum awarded, &and-
berg v. Victor Gold & Silver Minin J Co 
24 U. 1, 66 P. 360. * '' 
Collateral Eeferences. 
Mechanics' Liens€=»310(l). 
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 350. 
53 Am. Jur. 2d 942, Mechanics' f Liens 
§ 432. ' 
person defending against lien sidce this 
section confers that benefit not pnly on 
one who asserts lien but upon "the success-
ful party." Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 
U. (2d) 297, 452 P. 2d 325. 
Validity of lien. 
Where claims of materialman for me-
chanics' liens are valid, he is entitled to 
a reasonable attorney's fee under'this sec-
tion where penalty provided by 38-1-24 for 
alleged failure of materialman to release 
liens is sought by builder who contends 
that the liens are invalid. Brimwood 
Homes, Inc. v. Knudsen Buildefs Supply 
Co., 14 U. (2d) 419, 385 P. 2d 9^2. 
Materialman is not entitled to attorney's 
fee in proceedings to foreclose riiechanic's 
lien where the original notice o^ lien was 
deficient and attempted amendment to cor-
rect deficiencies was not filed lintil after 
the time for filing had expired. Eoberts 
Investment Co. v. Gibbons & peed Con-
crete Products Co., 22 U. (2d) 105, 449 P. 
2d 116. 
Collateral Eeferences. 
Mechanics' LiensC=»310(l). 
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens §^53. 
53 Am. Jur. 2d 943, Mechanics' Liens 
§ 433. 
Amount of compensation of attorney for 
services as to mechanic's lien in absence 
of contract or statute fixing J amount, 56 
A. L. E. 2d 114. 
38-1-18. Attorneys fees.—In any action brought to enforce an^ lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recqfer a 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. 
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owner as in this chapter provided, shall be deemed an original contractor, and all 
other persons doing work or furnishing materials shall be deemed subcontractor* 
[C. L. § 3815*: '90. p. 25*: *94, p. 47. 
1384. Priority over other incumbrances. The liens provided f0f 
herein are preferred to any lien, mortgage. i>r other incumbrance which n^ 
have attached subsequent to the time when thp building, improvement, or struo, 
ture was commenced, work done, or materials were .'nmmeneed to be furnish^ 
also to any lien, mortgage, or other incumbrance of which the lienholder had
 no 
notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, improvement,
 0r 
structure was commenced, work done, or materials commenced to be furnisher} 
[C. L. § 3810: '90. p. '29*: '9-L p. 47. 
y X X 1385. Id. Relates back. The liens herein provided shall relate ba^ 
to and take effect as of the time of the commencement to do work upon and fUr. 
nish materials on the ground for the structure or improvement, and -hall have 
priority over any lien or incumbrance subsequently intervening, except a Ij^ 
herein* provided* for of the same ela>s. or which may have been created pn<)r 
thereto, which was not then recorded and of which the lienor under this chapter 
did have actual notice. ['90, p. 29*: *94. p. 47. 
A deed of trust which covers all the property the such lien shall relate back to commencement „t-
owner then had. or might thereafter acquire, can- work or furnishing of materials, the subcontractor« 
not take precedence of a mechanic's lien for work lien attaches on the date of furnishing the first 
done and material furnished in building the canal. material, and payments thereafter made by th* 
Garland v. Bear River Irr. Company, 9 U. 3o0: 34 owner to the contractor, though before the lien u 
P. 368. Affirmed 164 U. S. 1. Under laws of 1S90 filed, are made at his own peril. I arey-Lombarri 
giving a lien to subcontractors, and providing that Co. v. Partridge, 10 U. 322: 37 P. 572. 
1386. Recording lien. Every original contractor, within sixty dav* 
after the completion of his contract, and every person save the original contractor 
claiming the benefit of this chapter, must, within forty days after furnishing the 
last material or performing the last labor for any building, improvement, or 
structure, or for any alteration, addition to. 0r repair thereof, or performance of 
any labor in or furnishing any materials for any mining claim, file for record 
with the county recorder of the county in whi<>h the property or some part thereof 
is situated, a claim in writing containing &, notice of intention to hold and 
claim a lien, and a statement of his demand, after deducting all just credits and 
offsets, with the name of the owner, if knowii and also the name of the person 
by whom he was employed, or to whom he fuftiished the material, with a state-
ment of the terms, time given, and conditions of his contract, specifying the rime 
when the first and last labor was performed, pr the first and last materials fur-
nished, and also a description of the property tp be charged with the lien, sufficient 
for identification, which claim must be verified bv the oath of himself or of some 
other person. [C. L. §3811*: '90, pp. 26-7*; '94, pp. 47-S. 
Under act of 1S69 the notice of lien must state only the contractor but laborers and materialmen 
the amount of money due. but need not state the had three months after the completion of the build-
time when due or to become due. Doane v. Clin- ing in which to file a notice of lien. Eclipse Mfg. 
ton, 2 U. 417. Under same act it was held that not Co. v. Nichols, 1 U. 252. 
1387. Joining l iens on separate properties. Liens against two or 
more buildings, mining claims, or other improvements owned by the same person 
or persons may be included in one claim; but in such case the person filing the 
claim must designate therein the amount claimed to be due to him on each 
of such buildings, mining claims, or other improvements. [C. L. § 3812*; '94, 
p. 48. 
1388. Fi l ing claim before doing work. Any subcontractor before 
commencing to furnish materials or to perform work, or at any time thereafter 
and before the completion of his contract, may file a statement of claim with the 
recorder as hereinbefore provided, containing a notice of intention to hold and 
claim a lien, a description of the property to be charged, and the probable value of 
the work to be done, or the probable value of tfie materials to be furnished, as near 
as mav be. From the time such statement srjall have been filed, he shall have a 
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statement of petitioner in open court with-
out any evidence being taken * * *." I 
think we are obligGd to review the repre-
sentations made to the court in the light 
most favorable to the petitioner. 
It is not for us to conjecture how the 
witness or witnesses would have impressed 
the court had the matter been tried and 
had they testified. It is the uniformly ac-
cepted rule that, where a motion is made 
for summary dismissal before evidence is 
presented, the court surveys the matter as 
it then stands in the light most favorable 
to the party against whom the motion is 
made.2 This is also true even after evi-
dence has been presented, if the motion 
is made before the party has rested his 
case.3 If the motion is granted the appel-
late court similarly reviews the record.4 
From whatever perspective we review the 
matter, I think the trial court was correct 
in dismissing the petition because there ap-
pears no basis in the petition, or in the 
statement of Mr. Arnovitz from which 
reasonable minds could fincl that Mrs. Val-
entine was incompetent. 
WADE, J., concurs in the opinion of 
CROCKETT, J. 
2. Holland v. Columbia Iron Min. Co., 4 
Utah 2d —, 293 P.2d 700. See Morris 
v. Farnsworth Motel, Utah. 250 P.2d 
297, 29S; Strauss v. Strauss, DO CaLApp. 
2d 757, 203 P.2d S57, S58. 
3. Arnold v. Sanstol, 43 Wash.2d 294, 260 
P.2d 327; Metzger v. Quick, 46 Wash.2d 
477, 232 P.2d 812; Eberle v. Himger-
294 P.2d 703 
Royal Audrey BACKUS, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
Gus S. HOOTEN and Ella H. Hooten, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 8375. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 1, 1956. 
Action against landowner to recover 
for rental of machinery and equipment used 
by contractor in leveling land. The District 
Court, Beaver County, Will L. Hoyt, J., en-
tered judgment dismissing plaintiff's com-
plaint and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Worthen, J., held that the statute re-
quiring an owner of land to obtain a bond 
from the contractor before work for im-
provement upon land is commenced, did not 
require owner to obtain bond from con-
tractor who contracted to level land, and 
failure of landowner to procure bond did 
not render him liable for the rental of the 
machinery used by the contractor. 
Judgment affirmed. 
!. Appeal and Error C=9I9 
Where trial court dismissed complaint 
for failure to state claim upon which relief 
could be granted, on appeal, complaint was 
required to be examined in light most fa-
ford, Colo., 274 P.2d 93; Wood v. Chi-
cago. M. & St. Paul R.R. Co., 45 Wash. 
2d 601r 277 P.2d 345. 
4. Martin v. Stevens, Utah, 243 P.2d 747; 
Moedy v. Moedy. Colo.. 276 P.2d 563; 
Leming v. Oil Fields Trucking Co., 44 
Cal.2d 343, 2S2 P.2d 23; 88 C.J.S., Trial, 
§242. 
BACKUS 
Cite as 4 
vorable to plaintiff's contention with every 
reasonable intendment in favor of allega-
tions of complaint. 
2. Mechanics' Liens C=3I3 
Under statute providing that owner ofj 
interest in land before entering into con-( 
tract, involving $500 or more, for "im-
provement upon land*' shall obtain bond 
from contractor for payment of materials 
furnished, owner of land who contracted to 
have land leveled was not required to obtain 
bond, and failure to procure bond did not 
render him liable to owner of machinery 
for rental of machinery used by contractor. 
U.C.A.1953, 14-2-1, 14-2-2. 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Improvement Upon Land". 
3. Mechanics' Liens 0=313 
The expression "or improvement upon 
land", as used in statute requiring owner of 
land contracting for construction, addition 
to, or alteration or repair of any building, 
structure or improvement upon land, to ob-
tain from contractor bond conditioned on 
payment of materials and labor used (re-
ferred only to improvements of a character 
similar to those specifically mentioned. 
U.C.A.1953, 14-2-1. 
. HOOTEN 
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Cline, Wilson & Cline, Milford, for ap-
pellant. 
Durham Morris, Cedar City, for respond-
ents. 
WORTHEN, Justice. 
Appeal from a judgment dismissing 
plaintiffs complaint on the ground that it 
failed to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
The complaint alleges that defendants 
own land in Beaver County, Utah; that 
they entered into a contract with one Jerry 
Busby by the terms of which contract Bus-
by agreed to level a number of acres of 
land on their property; that plaintiff ex-
tended credit to the said Jerry Busby and 
delivered to him certain machinery and 
equipment which were used by Busby in 
leveling said lands; that Busby agreed to 
pay plaintirT for the rental of said ma-
chinery and equipment but failed and neg-
lected to fully pay for same, notwithstand-
ing defendants paid Busby sufficient to have 
paid plaintiff. Defendants failed to obtain 
a private contractor's bond from Busby. 
PlaintirT contends that the contract be-
tween defendants and Busby is one for 
which a private contractor's bond is re-
quired, and having failed to require such 
bond the defendants are liable to plaintiff 
for the rental value of the leveling ma-
chinery and equipment used by Busby in 
leveling defendants' land. 
Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U.C.A.1953, 
provide: 
"14-2-1. The owner of any interest 
in land entering into a contract, involv-
ing $500 or more, for the construction, 
addition to, or alteration or repair of, 
any building, structure or improvement 
upon land shall, before any such work 
is commenced, obtain from the con-
tractor a bond in a sum equal to the 
contract price, with good and sufficient 
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sureties, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of the contract and 
prompt payment for material furnished 
and labor performed under the con-
tract. Such bond shall run to the own-
er and to all other persons as their in-
terest may appear; and any person 
who has furnished materials or per-
formed labor for or upon any such 
building, structure or improvement, 
payment for which has not been made, 
shall have a direct right of action 
against the sureties upon such bond for 
the reasonable value of the materials 
furnished or labor performed, not ex-
ceeding, however, in any case the 
prices agreed upon; * * * 
"14-2-2. Any person subject to the 
provisions of this chapter, who shall 
fail to obtain such good and sufficient 
bond, * * * shall be personally lia-
ble to all persons who have furnished 
materials or performed labor under the 
contract for the reasonable value of 
such materials furnished or labor per-
formed, not exceeding, however, in any 
case the prices agreed upon/' 
[1] The trial court having dismissed 
plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, we 
must examine the complaint in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff's contention and 
with every reasonable intendment in favor 
of the allegations of said complaint. 
The ruling presents two questions: (1) 
Is a contract for leveling land presumably 
so that it would be more susceptible to ir-
rigation and cultivation a contract "for the 
construction, addition to, or alteration or 
repair of, any building, structure or im-
provement upon land" so as to compel the 
landowners to require a bond from the con-
tractor? (2) If our first question is an-
swered in the affirmative, does rental equip-
ment furnish to the contractor which en-
ables him to perform the work with less la-
bor come under the term, "material fur-
nished and labor performed under the con-
tract"? 
[2,3] We are of the opinion that the 
work done upon defendants' land in leveling 
the same is not an improvement upon land 
requiring defendants to comply with the 
requirement of the statute. 
The reasonable interpretation of the leg-
islative intent, gathered from the statute, 
would seem to make it applicable only to 
contracts involving buildings or structures 
of some sort. 
It would seem to constitute a strain on 
the language of the statute to interpret it so 
as to hold that the contract before us was 
one for the construction of an improve-
ment upon land. To reach such a conclu-
sion would require that we put a strained 
construction on the statute and treat it as 
saying "For the construction, addition to, or 
alteration or repair of any building, struc-
ture or improvement upon land or for any 
improvement of land." 
The question here presented has not be-
fore been passed on by this court, nor has 
any case been called to our attention, nor 
have we found one passing on the same. 
BACKUS ^ 
Cite as 4 X 
The cases cited by both counsel involve 
mechanic's liens and each decision is ren-
dered with respect to the statute oi the par-
ticular state. Our attention has been called 
to an early Iowa case l which case has not 
been overruled. The Iowa code secured a 
lien to "every mechanic, or other person 
who shall do any labor upon, or furnish 
any materials, machinery, or fixtures, for 
any building, erection, or other improve-
ment upon land." Code 1873, § 2130. The 
lower court declared a lien on the land in 
favor of one who broke up prairie land by 
plowing. The Supreme Court reversed the 
case and used this language: 
"Now, while breaking and turning 
over of the soil may constitute an im- , 
provement of the land, it cannot in any 
just sense be denominated an improve-
ment upon the land. The breaking of 
the prairie is necessary to the growth 
of crops, but not more necessary than 
the annual plowing which precedes the 
planting of crops. If a lien should be 
allowed for the first breaking of the 
prairie, we are unable to see upon what 
principle it would be denied for the 
subsequent plowings, which are indis-
pensable to the proper cultivation of 
the soil.- Fertilizers greatly improve 
land. It would probably not be claimed 
that a lien would be acquired for haul-
ing manure upon land. It is not proper 
for us now to undertake to determine 
to what classes of improvements sec-
tion 2130 applies. The only question; 
which is before us is, does it apply to 
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the plowing of the soil? We think that 
to givt it such an application would 
extend it beyond what was contem-
plated by the legislature, and beyond 
what its language, fairly construed, 
justines." 
Let it be conceded that leveling land en-
hances its value and improves its utility. 
It does not follow that such leveling con-
stitutes an improvement upon land. It 
would seem to be an unreasonable con-
struction to hold that a contract for plow-
ing, seeding, or manuring of land is a con-
tract for the construction of an improve-
ment upon land. 
Xor do we feel that it is necessary to call 
upon any rules of statutory interpretation 
since the language seems not to require in-
terpretation. However, under a familiar 
rule oi construction the expression "or im-
provement upon land" can only refer to im-
provements of a character similar to those 
immediately before mentioned.2 
We are of the opinion that Section 14-2-1 
did not require defendants to obtain a bond 
before entering into the contract with Bus-
by to level their land. 
Because of our holding that the work 
which defendants engaged Busby to do does 
not come within the class for which a bond 
was required it is unnecessary for us to 
pass upon the second question raised. 
Judgment affirmed. Costs to defendants. 
McDOXOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
HEXRIOD and WADE, JJ., concur. 
I. Brown v. Wyman, 1S81, 56 Iowa 452, 9 2. Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd 
N.W. 344, 345, 41 Am.Rep. 117. Ed., Vol. 2, p. 393. Sec. 4909. 
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Affirmed, each party to bear its costs. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER 
and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the result. 
ELLETT, J., being disqualified did not 
participate therein. 
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Leon FREHNER and Minnie C. Frehner dba 
Mountain West Gardens, and Leon C. Freh-
ner, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Margaret MORTON, D. A. Skeen and Bertha 
K. Skeen, and Prudential Federal Savings 
& Loan Association, a corporation, Defend-
ants and Appellants. 
No. 10525. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 24, 1967. 
Action to recover for landscaping 
services. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Joseph G. Jeppson, J., render-
ed judgment from which defendants ap-
pealed and plaintiffs cross-appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that land-
REPORTS 
scape architect and contractor were en-
titled to lien for landscaping work. 
Affirmed. 
Nelson, District Judge, dissented. 
1. Mechanics' Liens C=l 
Purpose of mechanics' lien statute is 
to protect those who have directly added 
to value of real property by performing 
labor or furnishing material upon it. U.C. 
A.1953, 38-1-3. 
2. Mechanics1 Liens C=l 
Mechanics' lien statute is intended to 
prevent owner of land from taking benefits 
of improvements placed on his property 
without paying for labor and material that 
went into them. U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-3. 
3. Mechanics' Liens e»36 
Architects are protected by mechanics' 
lien statute and have lien when they have 
furnished plats, plans, maps, superintend-
ence, etc., or have rendered other like pro-
fessional services at instance of owner or 
any other person acting by his authority 
as agent, contractor or otherwise. 
4. Mechanics' Liens 0281(3) 
Evidence in action to enforce lien for 
services rendered in landscaping newly con-
structed house would support finding that 
plaintiffs' work had been authorized by de-
fendants, who were building house for their 
son engaged in several distinct occupa-
tions or businesses in the same licensing 
territory may be required to pay a license 
tax for each." 
FUEHRER 7. MORTON 
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daughter, in that defendants had authorized 
their daughter to engage plaintiff. U.C 
A. 1953, 38-1-3. 
423 
Allei i II . Swan, Salt Lake City, for 
respondents 
5.. Trial 0=374(2) 
Trial judge had sole prerogative to 
determine disputed questions of fact in 
equity matters. 
6. Mechanics' Liens C=245<2) 
Mechanics' lien foreclosure proceeding 
is equitable. U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-18. 
7. Equity 0=1 
District court has jurisdiction of both 
law and equity matters, but proceedings in 
equitable matters are not same as in law 
matters.. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 
1, 72(a); U.C.A.1953, 59-12-20. 
8. M ec h a n i cs' Lien s C=» 310(3) 
Plaintiffs in mechanics' lien foreclosure 
proceeding were not entitled to attorney 
fee in amount awarded by jury, rather than 
lesser amount awarded by court, in view 
of equitable nature of proceedings and stat-
ute providing that court should fix fee. 
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-1S. 
9. Mechanics'' Liens C=33(I) 
Landscape architect and contractor 
were entitled to lien for landscaping work. 
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-3. 
Benjamin Spence, Sal: L 
appellants. 
for 
ELLETT, Justice: 
Plaintiffs sued to collect for services 
rendered in landscaping around a newly 
constructed house owned by defendants 
Skeen in Summit Park, east of Salt Lake 
City, Utah. From a jury verdict and judg-
ment thereon in favor of the plaintiffs, the 
defendants appeal. 
The points urged are (1) that the court 
erred in ruling that the landscaping work 
comes within the laborers' and. materialmen's 
lien statute; and (2) that the evidence 
shows that the defendants did not authorize 
the work done. 
In the fall of 1964' the defendants Skeen 
obtained a loan from the defendant Pru-
dential Federal Savings &' Loan Associa-
tion to finance the building of a house on 
a lot they owned in Summit Park, so that 
their married daughter, Margaret Skeen 
Morton, and her children would have a 
place to live. It is shown that Margaret 
was given permission to direct the con-
struction according to her wishes and that 
she proceeded to oversee and make changes 
in the job as she desired. With Mr. Skeen's 
knowledge she engaged the plaintiffs to 
do the landscaping on the grounds, which 
included installation of a concrete waterfall 
and pool. 
424 18 UTAH 2d REPORTS 
The statute under which plaintiffs claim 
authorizes a lien for labor and material 
used in the " * * * construction or 
alteration of, or addition to, or repair of, 
any building, structure or improvement upon 
land." (Section 38-1-3, U.C.A.1953.) 
[1,2] The purpose of this statute as 
applied to this case is 10 protect those who 
have added directly to the value of real 
property by performing labor or furnishing 
material upon it. (Stanton Transportation 
Company v. Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 R2d 
207.) The statute is intended and designed 
to prevent the owner of land from taking 
the benefits of improvements placed on his 
property without paying for the labor and 
material that went into them. (King Broth-
ers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 
Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254.) 
[3] Architects are also protected and 
have a lien when they have furnished 
plats, plans, maps, superintendence and so 
forth, or when they have rendered other 
like professional services at the instance of 
the owner or any other person acting by 
his authority as agent, contractor or other-
wise. (See Headlund v. Daniels, 50 Utah 
381, 167 P. 1170.) 
Leon Frehner, one of the plaintiffs, was 
a professional landscape architect, and his 
wife, the other plaintiff, was a landscape 
contractor holding a license from the State 
of Utah as a specialty contractor. They 
designed and completed the landscaping in 
connection with the house being built by a 
general contractor. The defendants refused 
to pay on the grounds that they had not 
authorized the work. It is plain from the 
record that the defendant D. A. Skeen 
wanted his daughter, Margaret, and her 
children to have a. home, that all should 
be in accordance with her desires, and that 
in conformity with this purpose she was 
given a comparatively free hand as to its 
construction. Mr. Skeen indicated that he 
had had previous unsatisfactory dealings 
with the plaintiff, Mr. Frehner. Notwith-
standing this, he permitted Margaret to 
go ahead and obtain the plaintiffs services 
if she so desired. He also testified: 
Q. * * *, when she told you she 
wanted to landscape the land, did you 
have any other conversation with her 
about going ahead with it? 
A. Yes. I said, "If that is your de-
cision, Margaret, I want to have you 
happy, you make your decision—you be 
independent on it. I realize we will have 
to provide money to pay for the building, 
and if the landscaping is not included 
in that, I will have-to get the money on 
the side." 
[4] It is further shown that there was 
talk between the general contractor and 
Mr. Skeen about the plaintiff Frehner 
doing the work and that Mr. Skeen made 
no objection but allowed Frehner to con-
tinue. These facts provide a reasonable 
Cite as ISL* 
basis for the conclusions that the daughter, 
Margaret, was authorized by the defendants 
to engage the plaintiff to do the landscap-
ing; that it was done with the defendant 
knowledge: and that, therefore, under the 
statute their interest in the property was 
liable for the improvement thus conferred 
upon it, 
The trial judge impaneled a jury to try 
various issues but finally directed them as 
to liability and decided as a matter of law 
that plaintiffs held a valid and subsisting 
lien on the realty. The amount due and the 
amount thereof subject to the lien were left 
for determination by the jury, as was the 
amount of attorney's fees to be allowed for 
foreclosing the lien. 
The statute providing for attorney's fees 
is as follows; 
In any action brought to enforce any 
lien under this chapter the successful 
party shall be entitled to recover a reason-
able attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in 
the action. (Section 38-1-1S, U.C.A. 
1953.) 
The jury awarded a fee of $750, *-u: * r 
hearing defendants' motion for a new trie, 
and to set aside the verdict and judgment 
thereon, the court required the plaintiffs 
to submit to a reduction of attorney's fee 
to one-half of the total amount covered by 
the lien. 
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The plaintiffs cross-appealed and abked 
that the $750 attorney's fee be reinstated 
by thils court, 
^ . . v ;uld seem that the jury could 
only have been advisory to the trial judge, 
as it is his sole prerogative to determine 
disputed questions of fact in equity matters. 
A't the time of enacting Section 38—1-18 
above, the legislature undoubtedly worded 
the statute as they did because they believed 
the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien to be 
an equitable proceeding. 
The following language is taken from 36 
Am.Jr., Mechanics' Liens, § 239, at page 
152:1 
Where the distinction between actions 
at law and suits in equity is maintained, 
proceedings to enforce mechanics1 liens 
are regarded as suits in equity, although 
the complainant retains the title of the 
materials .furnished until paid for, and 
are governed by the rules of chancery 
, practice except so far as the mechanic's 
lien laws have otherwise provided. 
" ^ . .;e statute does nui uuie. \ ^ . .- -.>-
vii'e. Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper 
Mfg. Co.. 14 ;."::,» .v^, " i 71'.. hold: a 
lie:: foreclosure to \.e equital ,e. 
[7] In Utah the District Court has 
jurisdiction of both equity and law matters,. 
yet the proceedings in equitable matters 
arc not the same as in law matters. (See 
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Rules 1 and 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Section 59-12-20, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended; see also Zeile 
v. Moritz, 1 Utah 283.) 
[8] We, therefore, dismiss the plain-
tiffs' cross-appeal as being without merit, 
even assuming that they are entitled to a 
lien. If they are not entitled to a lien, 
they would not be entitled to an attorney's 
fee even though one or more of the de-
fendants might be liable for the value of 
the work done 
This leaves us with the problem of 
whether or not landscaping under the Utah 
law is work that may be protected by a me-
chanics lien. The lien statute covers ma-
terial furnished and work done in the con-
struction, alteration, or addition to or repair 
of any building, structure, or improvement 
upon land. It will be noted that the statute 
does not give the lien solely for improve-
ments to the land. This was decided in the 
case of Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah 2d 364, 
294 P:2d 703. That was a case where a 
contractor had leveled land so it could be 
cultivated and irrigated. The matter was 
before the Supreme Court under Section 
14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which 
makes a land owner personally liable for 
work done and material furnished when he 
does not require a bond from the contractor, 
etc. The language of the bond section is 
practically identical with that of the lien 
section: " * * * for the construction, 
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addition to, or alteration or repair of, any 
building, structure or improvement upon 
land * * *." 
In the Backus case it was said: 
We are of the opinion that the work 
done upon defendants' land in leveling 
the same is not an improvement upon 
land requiring defendants to comply with 
the requirement of the statute. 
The reasonable interpretation of the 
legislative intent, gathered from the stat-
ute, would seem to make it applicable only 
to contracts involving buildings or struc-
tures of some sort. 
* * * * * * 
Let it be conceded that leveling land en-
hances its value and improves its utility. 
It does not follow that such leveling con-
stitutes an improvement upon land. It 
would seem to be an unreasonable con-
struction to hold that a contract for plow-
ing, seeding, or manuring of land is a 
contract for1 the construction of an im-
provement upon land. 
Nor do we feel that it is necessary to 
call upon any rules of statutory* interpre-
tation since the language seems not to re-
quire interpretation. However, under a 
familiar rule of construction the expres-
sion "or improvement upon land" can 
only refer to improvements of a character 
similar to those immediately before men-
tioned. (Sutherland Statutory Construc-
tion, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2, p. 393, Sec. 4909.) 
FKEHFER 
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This is known in law as the Rule of Ejus-
dem Generis, sometimes called Lord Tenter-
den's Rule, the doctrine being that where an 
enumeration of specific things is followed 
by some more general word or phrase, such 
general word or phrase is to be held to refer 
to things of the same kind with respect to a 
classification which immediately precedes 
it. (28 C.J.5. p. 1049. See also Gaustad v. 
Xygaani 64 N.D. 785, 256 N.W. 230.) 
Now, if leveling land is not within the 
statute, why should landscaping in this case 
be so? The distinction is that the leveling 
of land in the Backus case was not done in 
connection with any building, structure, or 
improvement upon the land, while in the in-
stant case the landscaping was done as an 
integral part of the building of a home. 
The landscaping was designed to give the 
same esthetic qualities to the home as would 
the paint applied to the building after it was 
finished. Both are equally inherent in the 
enjoyment of the constructed home, 
[9] We, therefore, hold that where land-
scaping is clone during the construction of a 
1 lome and as an integral part of the con-
struction for the purpose of contributing 
toward the enjoyment to be had from living 
in that home, the work done and material 
furnished would be subject to a mechanic's 
lien. 
The judgment of the District Court is af-
firmed. Each party will bear its own costs. 
v. MORTON 
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CALLISTER and TUCKETT, J] ., 
HEXRIOD, Justice (concurring in the re-
sult) 
I concur in the result but not ii i some 
portions of the main opinion that seem to 
be obiter that might be construed erroneous-
ly in its application to possible future cases. 
It is said therein that *'It will be noted 
that the statute does not give the lien for 
improvements to the land.*' True. But the 
statute says upon the land. Backus v. 
Hooten says nothing to the contrary, but did 
use some gratuitous and unnecessary lan-
guage with respect to plowing, fertilizer and 
seeds, all of which had little or nothing to 
do with leveling of the land,—the only ques-
tion in that case. 
I think the lien and bond statutes quoted 
were an outgrowth of the common law con-
cept respecting personalty as it relates to 
realty. This concept contemplated the "af-
fixation*' of something to the realty, which 
something, if uprooted or jerked out, seri-
ously would impair the land itself and pos-
sibly the marketability of the fee. 
Leveling off sagebrush affixes nothing to 
the realty. M ami re adds only a temporary 
offensive odor, and many times seeds add 
only to the digestion of our feathered 
friends,—ail of which need no compendium 
here,—where only shrubbery incident to the 
erection of a home is concerned, which 
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home, like the shrubbery, is affixed to the 
realty, as usually is the case with a furnace 
or Dutch oven. I think the common law 
analogy of affixation to the realty should 
be the test. The instant case meets that 
test, but does not bottom its result on that 
ground. If Hooten had been confined to 
its own facts, I wouldn't give a hoot, but it 
has, besides sagebrush, a few little Virginia 
creepers- in its verbage or verbiage that 
might obscure the lien law landscape. 
The main opinion concludes that "where 
landscaping is done during the construction 
of a home and as an integral part of the 
construction for the purpose of contributing 
toward the enjoyment to be had from liv-
ing in that home," a lien attaches. 
I don't think the enjoyment of the home 
has anything to do with the problem, since 
there is at least anticipatory enjoyment in 
spreading fertilizer on a plowed plot plant-
ed with lawnseed. And I don't think lien-
ability depends on whether the labor and 
materials were furnished during the con-
struction of the home. 
I think the realistic test is whether they 
were furnished for the purpose of affixing 
something that would become a part of the 
realty in the common law concept, whether 
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accomplished during the construction of the 
home or later, irrespective of the question 
of enjoyment and regardless of distance 
from the home, if it can be demonstrated 
that an affixation to the realty was con-
templated and accomplished. (Emphasis 
added.) 
XELSOX, District Judge (dissenting). 
I cannot agree with the distinction made 
by the prevailing opinion of the instant case 
with that of Backus v. Hooten.1 
Nor do I agree that in the instant case 
the so-called landscaping was done as an 
integral part of the building of a home. 
Nor can I accept the conclusion that the 
installation of a concrete waterfall and pool 
gave the same esthetic qualities to the 
house, which was erected, as would the 
paint applied to the building after it was 
finished. 
The enjoyment of a building should not 
be a determinant in the interpretation and 
application of the mechanic lien law. 
For the reasons stated, I dissent. 
CROCKETT, C. J., having disqualified 
himself did not participate herein. 
1. Backus v. Hooten. 4 Utah 2d 364, 294 P.2d 703. 
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n May 4, 1966, as to the investigation 
ndings of the disciplinary proceedings 
ht against John Klwood Dennett, said 
ussion recommending his disbarment; 
hereafter, on May 21, 1966, Mr. D a i -
ly counsel filed with this Court a IVti-
or Remand of the matter to the Bar 
nission on the basis that Mr, Dennett 
lenicd due process for the reason that 
an accused had not been given an op-
nily to be heard by the Commission be-
the lattcr's recommendation; that 
ug thereon was had before the Court 
me 6, 1966; that thereafter, on June 6. 
the matter was returned to the Bar 
nission with a request that such an op-
nitty be granted; that thereafter, in re-
>e to such request, the Bar Commission, 
ut one member present, afforded such 
rtunity and heard Mr, Dennett and his 
sel on June 15, 1966, at Park City, Utah, 
after considering the arguments pre-
(1, returned the matter to this Court, re-
ining the original recommendation; 
thereafter, on July 7, 1966, Mr. Dennett 
a petition objecting to the Bar Coin-
ion's action, requesting, for medical rea-
, a suspension, rather than disbarment; 
thereafter on July 22, 1966, Mr. Den-
filed a Petition for Review, without 
ing the Petition of July 7, 1966; that 
foregoing petitions were argued to the 
it by counsel for Mr. Dennett and for 
Bar Commission, at the termination of 
h argument counsel for both sides 
dated in writing as follows: 
L E E P O R T S 
It is hereby stipulated by counsel for 
Mr. Dennett and for the State l iar Com-
mission that following the hearing of 
this matter this day the matter is sub-
milled for plenary review by the Supreme 
Court upon the record before the Court, 
the arguments which were made before 
the Board of Bar Commissioners at Park 
City (June 15, 1966) being submitted 
together with oral arguments made this 
day as the arguments of the matter be-
fore the Court. 
Having heard the arguments, reviewed 
the matter and the pleadings, it is ordered 
that the recommendation of the Utah Bar 
Association be sustained, and it is ordered 
and adjudged that Mr. John Klwood Dennett 
be, and he is, disbarred from the practice of 
law in the State of Utah, and that his name 
be, and hereby is, stricken from the roll of 
Attorneys of the State of Utah. 
( ' . >. ' I ' l l * S»1HMJ> 
. :' :M 2tf! 
Ruth W, SB - J . n . ' H t f f f ami Respondent, 
v. 
Roy A. M E N L O V E , cilia Meniove Construction 
Company, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 10405. 
Supreme Court of lit all. 
Aug. 5, VMM*. 
Suit in contract whereby defendant 
agreed to build a house for plaintiff for 
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cost plus ten percent. The j i f y in District 
Court, Salt Pake County, Aldon j . Ander-
son, J., found that defendant substantially 
performed, that reasonable cost phis ten 
percent totaled $ 13,000 and that plaintiff 
was entitled to $1,230.22 damages for de-
fendant's failure to fully perform. Defend-
ant appealed, seeking about $-19,000 or new 
trial. The Supreme Court, Crockett, j . , 
held that exclusion of evidence of a sum-
marized exhibit of costs prepared from 
detailed exhibits was within discretion of 
trial court and that evidence supported 
jury 's findings of cost plus ten percent 
totaling $13,000 and that attorney's fees 
and costs were properly refused, 
judgment affirmed. 
1. Trial e^I39(t) 
The. jury has exclusive prerogative to 
determine credibility of evidence and to 
find facts. 
2. Evidence <t^50n, 590 
Witnesses €=^370 
The jury is not obligated to accept testi-
mony whenever there is a basis from which 
bias, prejudice or self-interest may be seen, 
or there is anything incredible in testimony. 
3. Contracts €=^322(5) 
Damages €==>I40 
In a suit on contract to build a house 
for cost plus ten percent, reasonable basis 
existed in evidence to justify jury in re-
fusing to believe that cost plus ten percent 
totaled more than $13,000 awarded; and in 
finding that plaintiff was entitled to offset 
MENLOVE 
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of $1,230.22 for defendant's failure t« 
perform. 
4. Appeal and Error €=5210(7) 
Party complaining of refusal to g; 
structions must submit accurate reque^ 
instructions, and they must be neithci 
leading nor argumentative. 
5. Trial 0^220(3) 
Purpose of iustiuclious is suffie 
.. .'otnplished if language of iustrueh 
•an h that issues are understandabli 
f '''is are ascertainable to resolve issu< 
0. Appeal and Error <3^I067 
If language of instructions to jn 
such that issues are understandable 
facts are ascertainable to resolve i^  
trial court 's failure to give instruction 
quested by defendant will not conslituf 
vcrsible error. 
7. Evidence €^350 
Summary of evidence, to be admis-
must be shown to have been developed t 
records, books or documents, eoinpctcm 
which has been established and records i 
be available for examination and wil 
must be subject to cross-examination 
ccrning such evidence. U.C.A.1953, 7H 
16 and (5). 
0. Evidence €^302 
Admission in evidence of a sumn 
of evidence rests largely within so 
discretion of trial court. U.C.A.1953, 
25-16 and (5) . 
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Evidence C=>356 
Tn a suit on defendant's contract to 
ild a house for cost plus ten percent, cx-
ision of exhibit summarizing evidences 
costs as shown in several more detailed 
liihits which were neither so numerous 
•r complicated that they could not be com-
lently appraised by jury and as to which 
ere were indications of uncertainty was 
•t improper. U.C.A.1953, 78-25-16 and 
>. Costs €=> 173(1) 
In a suit on contract to build a house 
•r plaintiff for cost plus ten percent, in 
icw of jury finding that cost plus ten pcr-
•nt totaled $43,000 and not $49,000 as 
laimed by defendant and an offset for 
laintiff for $1,230.22, rejection of defend-
nt's request for attorney's fees and costs 
as not an abuse of discretion. U.C.A.1953, 
S-l-17, 3&-1-18. 
George M. McMillan, Franklin D. John-
on, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Brycc E. Roe, Salt Lake City, for re-
pondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
This suit arises out of a written contract 
»y which the defendant Roy A. Mcniovc 
igrccd to build a house for the plaintiff at 
1203 Yale Avenue in Salt Lake City for 
cost plus ten per cent. Upon a trial by jury 
i)f the various issues presented it found: 
(1) that defendant had substantially pcr-
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formed; (2) that his reasonable cost plus 
ten per cent totaled $13,000; (3) that his re-
quest for reasonable attorney fees, costs and 
certain other disbursements was without 
merit; and (4) plaintiff was entitled to an 
offset of $1,230.22 damages for defendant's 
failures lo fully perform. Defendant ap-
peals, seeking judgment in the amount he 
claims due of about $49,000, or a new trial. 
The contract referred to was entered into 
in November of 1962. It provided: (1) 
that the defendant was to construct the 
house in accordance with plans and at the 
most reasonable cost available, plus ten 
per cent; (2) that bills for labor, materials 
and expenses would be submitted to the 
plaintiff monthly, or more frequently if 
necessary; (3) that defendant would carry 
any type of insurance necessary in the 
state of Utah, and (4) that defendant 
wquld obtain all bids and information and 
consult with plaintiff before letting sub-
contracts. No limit was stated as to the 
overall cost, hut testimony indicated it was 
intended to be about $35,000. 
Defendant procured most of the materials 
through Apex Lumber Company in which 
he owns a substantial interest. The policy 
of Apex was to charge the contractor (Men-
love) cost plus ten per cent for materials 
and supplies. Five per cent was allocated 
to overhead and five per cent was credited 
to the owner-purchaser's (Menlovc's) equity 
in the Apex Company. The total of the cost 
,plus ten per cent was charged to the plain-
SHUPE v. MENLOVE 
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tiff as part of the costs of construction. In credibility of evidence and to find 
addition to this, Mcniovc added another 
ten per cent" for social security, payioil tax-
es and unemployment insurance; and lo Ibis 
total was added the final ten per cent for 
the contractor's profit. 
For the months of November, December, 
January and February statements were 
presented to the plaintiff and were paid. 
Thereafter no statement was presented until 
June 10, 1963, when a statement covering 
March, April
 ¥ and May, totaling $19,000 
plus dollars was presented to the plaintiff. 
This brought the total to $38,000, and there 
was several thousand dollars woith of woik 
yet to be done, which precipitated contro-
versy. The defendant continued to perform 
work on the premises for some months 
thereafter and eventually this lawsuit was 
filed to resolve their differences. 
[1-3] It is* defendant's position that 
since the jury found that he substantially 
pcrfoimcd his agreement to construct the 
house that it follows as a matter of law that 
he is entitled to the costs shown by his own 
evidence, phis the ten per cent profit agreed 
upon, totaling $-19,630. The fallacy in this 
contention is the assumption that the jury 
was obliged lo believe and accept the de-
fendant's evidence and records as absolute. 
It is true that the juiy cannot be petiuitted 
to unreasonably and arbitrarily disregard 
competent credible evidence. I5ut it is 
their exclusive prerogative to determine the 
There arc several things which 
could regaid as easting some dot 
whether the icroids kept hy the < 
on this job and in its relationship 
were complete and accurate. It w 
that there were some inadequacies 
certainties as to a breakdown in n 
tin's Shtipc residence. Tn fact, tl 
no such complete segregation in. 
shortly before the trial. It was 
dicated that the defendant's men \ 
mittcd to keep their own time rce 
were not required to show what t 
spent on the vat ions phases of eon* 
The witnesses called by the defen 
an interest to serve. Two of the 
ones were the defendant's (Mcnlo\ 
associated in the construction 
Others were subcontractors who 
been paid and who admitted an in 
the outcome of the case. 
As wc have heretofore stated: " 
ever there is a basis fiom which bia 
dice or self-interest may be seen, 
is anything incredible in the testin 
jury is not obligated to accept it." 
the grounds just discussed, and th 
as wc view it, there appears to be .'i 
able basis in the evidence to justify 
in refusing to believe that the cost 
per cent totaled more than the 
awarded; and in finding that the 
was entitled to the offset of $1,230 
I. Sec Pngc v. Fed. Seruiily JiiMiir. Co., 8 Utah 2d 220, W2 I'.2d (»(Ki. 
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4 61 (Yttaiu c i n n s a i r acsigned with 
pcct to the instinct inns which we do not 
•in it necessary to detail hut with respect 
reto make these observations: In rcgatd 
refusal to give instructions, it is essential 
it the complaining pait> has suhmitted 
curate icquests, and that they he neither 
steading nor argumcntalhe.* The pur-
se of the instructions is sufficiently ac-
mplishcd if they present the case to the 
ry in language from which they will 
iderstand the issues involved and which 
fords them an oppoituuity to asccttain the 
scntial facts and resolve those issues, 
this is done, the meie fact that the trial 
mi t failed to give insti tietions i cqucsted 
/ the defendant, even though accuiate 
ill not constitute icveisihle nioi ."1 
[7-91 Krror is also assigned in rejecting 
u exhihit prcpatcd and offered in evidence 
y the defendant. It purpotted to sum 
laiize the claimed costs as shown in severa 
norc detailed exhihits, 5 through 12, Sec 
8-25-16 U.C.A.1953 permits the use of -
ummary of evidence in certain instances, 
>ne of which is subsection (5), when "the 
>rigina! consists of numerous accounts oi 
»thcr documents which cannot he examined 
in coutt without great loss of time, and the 
evidence sought from them is only the 
general icsnll of the whole." However, as 
we have heretofore stated: " [ T J h e c\ i-
dence must he shown to he developed, fioci 
iccoids, hooks or documents, the coir 
2, I.und v. Mtn. Fuel Supply Co., 12 Utah 
2«1 2(IS, r»(>5 I\2«I rr,:*,; P.hminqui^t v. 
Iniffolon Mfg. Co., 47 Wnsh.2«t H'2% 2S<) 
1\2«1 1011. 
3 Sen Wilson v. Onnlner, It) Ftnli 2»1 81), 
318 I\2<1 U.U; ICnrle v. Suit Lnk« & 
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petency of which has been established, and 
the iccoids must he available foi examina-
tion by the opposing p.ntie^ and the witness 
subject to cross examination concerning 
such evidence." * '| he rpicstion as to wheth-
ci these conditions aii met is for the liial 
court to deletmiuc and u s t s hugely within 
his sound discretion. Tn regaul to this ex-
hibit Mr. M e n b n c testified: 
"I utilized the imoices and the infoima-
tion on this invoice relative to material-
and when they were delivered and the 
labor as is shown there, and by my ow i 
infoimalion or knowledge, what I coub 
lemember fiom the job. Also what ty p« 
of win k indi\ iduals were doing for u 
on the job." 
ii of feting the exhibit counsi I s tated: 
"We would stipulate that if thete are an 
items which are contained in this exhihr 
- which ate not reflected in the evidence 
they ma\ be disregai ded." 
In addition to these indications of unce-
tainty, it is further to be observed that ex-
hibits 5 Ihiough 12 aie neither so numerous 
nor so cnmplicab d that they could not be 
competently examined and appiaiscd by the 
imy. 1 he tiial couit was within its prciog 
ative in excluding the pioposcd exhibit. 
(10] The final claim of en or we gi\** 
attention to is the trial couit 's lefusal i-f 
defendant's request for attorney fees and 
co^ts. 'I In p t i t i m n t statutes a r c : 
vu\\\ u . <'<*>i>.f m o Utah i n , i«;r> i \2d 
S77. 
4. Rco Mpuiuiii* \ !*.«»> h*s t.ti^-. Drilling 
C«,., 1 Utah 2.1 .'Ml. 2!U I'.'Jfl (ISO. 
SCHOW v. GUARDTONE INC 
( ' l i e m 18 f t j th 2«I 1,'?H 
'Section .>S* 1 17.- As b» (ween the owner " 7 f*2«I ill'A 
, . i , l i t . , * r n i i l i ' i r l . i f I hi" rf*utt r / , , i / / nh~ 
' Russell S, s cHOW and Doris Re! 
hot lion the costs in mutiny to the lipht of
 wlfr» Pinlntjffs ,nnl Apfiollar 
*//e C(tSC, btft ifl a l ' r'lSCS e-.rh <mhenii-
 Y> 
iaeior exhibiting a lieu shall have his GUARDTONF, INC., a Nevada roi 
-«sts awaided to him, including the costs ei al n-fpnilaii!s and nrciinm 
)( preparing and recording the notice of No. I051G. 
zlaim of lien and such reasonable at tor- ,'I|J(I., „„, Court of Ktali 
ley's fee as may he incut red in piepai ing ^
 >jf 
uid iccoiding said notice of claim of lien. 
'Section 38-1-18.—In any action biought Action b\ hoincouueis to 1 
o enforce' any lien under this chapter tracts relating tn pui chase of 
'he successful party shall be entitled to uiutiicatinii and fife alarm system 
recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to be %<>id for fraud. 1 he Fourth Pisti 
pved by the court, which shall be ta.uul I'bili County, U. L. Tuckctt, J , 
r
 t osls in this action." (Kiiiphasts add- i n n \cidict in f.»\or of plain! 
ul . ) they appealed. 'I he Supreme (« 
It is plain that these two sections relating ' ^ " " " K " . J-, "eld that jury was 
to this subject should be construed together i n K"<K»S t 1 , a t a f r a , I ( I h ^ l keen 
and that when attorney fees are awardable " n t ^ » t i f f s f and that jury c< 
thereunder they aie to be treated as costs ^"^>1y refuse to believe that t\, 
which, as expressed in 3H 1-17 the couit -'^signce of contract was mi iiino< 
/'shall appoition the costs according to the chaser. 
liKlit of tlK- case". Vic»viiiR the overall R ( . v c r s c d .-,,„, rcmnml.-d uil 
pictuie of this case in the lii^ht most favor- , . 
ii"iis to enter judgment m arcoida 
able to the facts as found by the iuiv and 
«. iv verdict. to the verdict and judgment we cannot sa\ 
that the dial com t abused its discietion in ' J"«»9mcnt O^I9fl(3.im 
i ejecting defendant's contentions, Trial judge's pi erogativc I 
Judgment at finned. CosH to plauiU indgiueiit not w itli-Ianding verdict » 
(icspondent). e« h" n e exercised only in situatio 
there is no reasonable basis in e\ i 
J IKNRIOI) . t\ J , and Aid)(>NOU< i l l j n s t i f v Venlic«. 
.nii.1 C A L L I S T k R , \].t concut. 
2. Contracts €^99(3) 
\VAl)I r , J., heaid the aiguiueuls but died "j"|,0 first cpiesti(,n in action 
before the opinion was filed. contiaets \oided for fiaud is whetb 
